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peal legislation, the Trump administration has other options to
undermine Obamacare, including
weakening enforcement of penalties for not obtaining insurance
and eliminating federal payments
to insurers that are required to
provide cost-sharing subsidies to
lower-income Americans for deductibles and copayments.5 Such
actions could explode the individual insurance marketplaces. The
ACA’s insurance exchanges remain vulnerable: in some states
they have been buffeted by high
premium increases and insurer
withdrawals. The continuing uncertainty over the ACA’s fate could
lead more insurers to exit these
marketplaces, potentially leaving
Americans in some areas of the
country with no options for buying subsidized coverage.
President Trump remarked that
“nobody knew that health care
could be so complicated.” Republicans’ struggles to turn their

The compromises under discussion between the White House
and House Republicans — enabling states to opt out of ACA
provisions requiring that insurers
not charge sicker persons higher
premiums (community rating) and
provide essential health benefits
(such as maternity services) —
could further alienate moderate
Republicans who are already uncomfortable with the bill’s effect
on Medicaid and insurance coverage. The changes the House bill
makes to insurance regulation also
could run afoul of Senate budget
reconciliation rules. And rolling
back the ACA’s popAn audio interview
ular consumer prowith Dr. Oberlander
tections, including
is available at NEJM.org
those for persons
with preexisting conditions, will
spark additional controversy. Thus,
the prospects of GOP efforts to
resurrect repeal and replace remain highly uncertain.
If Republicans cannot pass re-

repeal-and-replace rhetoric into reality underscore just how complicated it is.
Disclosure forms provided by the author
are available at NEJM.org.
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el Hill.
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A Citizen’s Pathway Gone Astray — Delaying Competition
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M

any medicines are making
headlines these days not for
their breathtaking ability to save
lives, but for their soaring prices.
Part of the problem occurs because
pharmaceutical companies have
become adept at converting regulatory pathways into vehicles for
profit-boosting pricing strategies.
Consider the citizen-petition process that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) implemented
in the 1970s to give the average
citizen a way to voice concerns.
A recent large-scale study we con-

ducted using 12 years of FDA data
reveals that the concerned citizen
is frequently a drug company
raising frivolous or questionable
claims in a last-ditch effort to
hold off competition.1,2
The Hatch–Waxman Act of
1984 created a regulatory regime
to facilitate rapid market entry of
generics, allowing manufacturers
of generic drugs to rely on clinical trial data from their drugs’
brand-name counterparts. Today,
more than three quarters of prescriptions are filled with generic
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versions, whose availability can
reduce the price of a drug substantially. In response, drug companies have developed complex
strategies to block entry by generics. Their incentive is clear: delaying competition for just a few
months can translate into hundreds of millions of dollars in
revenue.
Focusing on strategies that involve manipulation of the citizenpetition pathway, we analyzed
the timing of the filing of citizen
petitions relative to the filing and
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approval of the generics that they
had the potential to block. We
hypothesized that filings would
be concentrated toward the end of
the generic drug’s approval process, acting as a final barrier to
market entry.
In examining all citizen petitions filed between 2000 and 2012
that could have delayed a generic’s
market entry, we found widespread, strategic use of the citizenpetition pathway by drug companies striving to hold off
competition. Specifically, nearly
half of the petitions in the final
data set were filed within a year
and a half before the FDA approved the generic, with roughly
40% filed a year or less before
generic approval (see graph). The
clustering of filings at the end of
the approval process suggests that
the motive is delay. It is possible
that the company filing the petition became aware of the problem it purported to see with its
competitor’s application only late
in the process. The FDA has noted,
however, that many petitions “contained data that had been available to the petitioner well before
the date of the petition.”3 Thus, it

appears that a large proportion of
drug companies are using citizen
petitions as an 11th-hour effort
to prevent generic competitors
from gaining FDA approval and
entering the market.
Use of this delay strategy has
increased over the past decade:
the number of such petitions filed
has effectively doubled since 2003
(see table). In some years, one of
every five FDA citizen petitions
(which include petitions related
to devices, food, dietary supplements, and tobacco, as well as to
drugs) has had the potential to
obstruct generic competition.
Some petitions we examined
did appear to raise legitimate concerns, and the FDA ruled accordingly. For example, in 2003, Wyeth
Pharmaceuticals asked the FDA
to refrain from approving generic
versions of its immunosuppressant
Rapamune (sirolimus), whose
makers had removed part of the
labeling. The FDA agreed that
omitting the labeling, which described a regimen to reduce the
risk of renal function impairment, created safety concerns.
Such petitions, however, appear
to be the exception rather than
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Months between Citizen Petition Filing and Generic Approval

Months between Citizen Petition Filing and Generic Approval, 2000–2012.
Ranges of months along the x axis indicate the period from the lower number up to but
not including the higher number. Data are from Feldman et al.1
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the rule. The FDA denies the requested action for approximately
80% of citizen petitions filed by
competitors against drug companies.4 For example, in 2007, Mutual Pharmaceuticals asked the
FDA to delay approval of other
generic versions of the bloodpressure medicine Plendil (felodipine), citing concerns about how
Seville orange juice, as opposed to
“regular” orange juice, affected
absorption. Seville oranges are a
smaller, more bitter orange often
used for marmalade and liquors.
The FDA denied the petition, stating that Mutual had “offered no
data to support [its] hypothesis.”
Another illustrative case is the
petition filed by Warner Chilcott
regarding its acne medication
Doryx (doxycycline). On the eve of
generic approval, Warner began
marketing Doryx tablets with two
score lines as opposed to one and
asked the FDA to require that all
generic versions also be dualscored. Citing the lack of any safety concern associated with singlescored tablets, the FDA denied the
petition and immediately approved
a single-scored generic.
Yet some petitions representing pure delay tactics have been
granted. For instance, many petitions ask the FDA to stay approval of the generic version until the
applicant conducts a test that is
already required for approval. The
FDA is forced to grant the petition, even though the demands
are redundant given the existing
requirements.
In 2007, Congress amended the
FDA Act in an attempt to block
potential avenues for abuse, requiring that the agency respond
to citizen petitions related to generics within 180 days (shortened
to 150 days in 2012) and providing that the agency can summarily deny petitions that are intend-
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Delay-Related Citizen Petitions, by Year.*

Year

No. of
Delay-Related
Petitions

Percent of
All Petitions
(no./total no.)

2000

2

4.3 (2/47)

2001

4

6.3 (4/63)

2002

5

4.7 (5/106)

2003

12

10.0 (12/120)

2004

26

14.6 (26/178)

2005

15

10.1 (15/148)

2006

24

13.0 (24/184)

2007

25

15.6 (25/160)

2008

23

13.9 (23/166)

2009

32

18.7 (32/171)

2010

31

20.8 (31/149)

2011

22

14.0 (22/157)

2012

28

19.9 (28/141)

*	Data are from Feldman et al.1

ed to delay generic entry and “raise
no valid scientific or regulatory
issues.” Unfortunately, the 2007
amendments have been largely
toothless. Imposing a new deadline may have reduced the delay
between when the FDA would
have approved the generic and
when it actually did so after reviewing the petition, but our data
show that the number of delayrelated petitions continued to grow
after the amendments were passed.
Moreover, as of fiscal year 2014,
the FDA had not summarily denied a single petition under the
relevant provision.5
What policies may succeed
where the 2007 amendments have
floundered? One option is to simply prohibit companies from filing citizen petitions referencing
generic-drug applications. Companies could continue to submit
generalized petitions, however,
such as those asking the FDA to
reconsider all labeling related to a
given drug. Such petitions would
have the effect of delaying mar-

ket entry of generics without explicitly naming them. Moreover,
some company petitions are justified, and safety must remain the
FDA’s priority.
Another possible remedy would
be to pursue punitive measures to
deter pharmaceutical companies
from manipulating the citizenpetition process. For example, on
February 7, 2017, the Federal Trade
Commission filed an antitrust action against Shire ViroPharma,
alleging that the company abused
regulatory processes by filing 43
submissions with the FDA (including 24 meritless citizen-petition
filings within one docket) in an
effort to hold off generic competition for its gastrointestinal drug
Vancocin (vancomycin). According
to the complaint, the behavior
resulted in costs to patients and
other purchasers amounting to
hundreds of millions of dollars.
Antitrust actions are expensive,
however, and the burdens of proof
under current law make it difficult for the government to pursue
such actions.
We believe the most promising approach would be to erect
procedural blocks, and in November 2016, new FDA rules took
small steps toward doing so. For
example, the new rules specify
that the FDA cannot delay approval of a pending generic drug
unless “a delay is necessary to
protect the public health.” In
general, however, the rules follow
the same format as before, in
which the definition of delay of
approval, the timing of the process, and the limited remedies
available leave plenty of room for
strategic behavior. Stronger procedural blocks — such as requiring that drug companies file their
citizen petitions within a year after the generic company files its
application, or establishing that
n engl j med 376;16
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issues raised by petitions will be
resolved on a separate timeline
from the generic’s approval process — are needed to reduce incentives for strategic efforts to
undermine competition.
Regardless of the policy approach taken, greater transparency is essential. As we collected
data, gaps in the FDA’s current
system for publicly available information came into sharp relief.
Finding information as basic as
application filing dates for generic drugs required poring through
volumes of letters and approval
documents, and the information
we sought was often entirely absent. Without increased transparency, society cannot curb strategic
behaviors such as citizen-petition
abuse. And as always, the public
pays the cost.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors
are available at NEJM.org.
From the Institute for Innovation Law, Uni
versity of California Hastings College of the
Law, San Francisco.
This article was published on March 1,
2017, at NEJM.org.
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